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Abstract
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity
where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is
the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The
model does not restrict the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude, and we show that it pro-
vides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity
aversion, as well as to represent context-dependent negative and positive ambiguity at-
titudes documented in experiments. We prove that our baseline representation, Boolean
expected utility (BEU), yields a novel representation of the class of invariant biseparable
preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004), which drops uncertainty
aversion from maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), while extensions
of BEU allow for more general departures from independence.
1 Introduction
A central approach to modeling preferences under ambiguity is based on the idea that the
decision-maker (DM) quantifies uncertainty with a set of relevant beliefs (i.e., probability
measures) and may use a different belief from this set to evaluate each uncertain prospect.
A well-known limitation underlying many such multiple-prior models—notably Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility model and several of its generalizations1—is
a restrictive mechanism of belief selection, whereby the DM evaluates each prospect ac-
cording to the worst possible relevant belief. Behaviorally, this restriction is reflected by
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Yaouanq: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich (yves.leyaouanq@econ.lmu.de). This research was sup-
ported by NSF grant SES-1824324 and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190. We
thank David Ahn, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Jetlir Duraj, Drew Fudenberg, Faruk Gul, Jay Lu, Fabio Mac-
cheroni, Pietro Ortoleva, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Kota Saito, Tomasz Strzalecki, and audiences at Caltech,
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Schmeidler’s (1989) uncertainty aversion axiom, which captures a negative attitude towards
ambiguity through a strong form of preference for hedging. Subsequent work has questioned
this formalization of ambiguity aversion and proposed several alternative definitions and
measures.2 The experimental literature documents yet more nuanced patterns of ambiguity
attitudes, with the same subjects appearing ambiguity-averse in some decision problems but
ambiguity-seeking in others, depending on contextual features of each problem (for a survey,
see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015).
In this note, we propose a class of multiple-prior representations that provides a unified
lens through which to understand different formalizations of ambiguity aversion, as well as
the context-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes documented in experiments.
To capture a flexible mechanism of belief selection, our representations adopt a “dual self”
perspective on ambiguity, by modeling the belief the DM uses to evaluate any given prospect
as the outcome of a game between two conflicting forces or selves, henceforth Pessimism and
Optimism.3
Our baseline representation is a parsimonious generalization of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
(1989) maxmin expected utility model. Under Boolean expected utility (BEU),4 there is a
compact collection P of closed and convex sets of beliefs and an affine utility u such that the
DM evaluates each act f according to
WBEU(f) = max
P∈P
min
µ∈P
Eµ[u(f)].
That is, the belief used to evaluate f is the outcome of a sequential zero-sum game: First,
Optimism chooses a set of beliefs P from the collection P with the goal of maximizing the
DM’s expected utility to f ; then Pessimism chooses a belief µ from P with the goal of
minimizing expected utility. Maxmin expected utility corresponds to the extreme special
case where Optimism has no choice, while the opposite extreme case, maxmax expected
utility, provides Pessimism with no choice. Other special cases include Choquet expected
utility (Schmeidler, 1989) and α-maxmin.
Our first main result is that BEU represents the class of preferences over Anscombe-
2E.g., Epstein (1999); Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002); Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido (2011); Dow
and Werlang (1992); Baillon, Huang, Selim, and Wakker (2018).
3The idea that the DM consists of multiple strategic selves with conflicting motives is employed frequently
in behavioral economics, for example to model risk preferences and intertemporal choices (e.g., Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Brocas and Carrillo, 2008).
4We borrow this terminology from mathematical analysis (e.g., Ovchinnikov, 2001), where a functional
W : Rn → R is said to admit a Boolean representation with respect to a family of functionals {Vi}i∈I if
there is some collection J of subsets of I such that W (x) = maxJ∈Jmini∈J Vi(x) for all x; that is, denoting
the max and min operator by ∨ and ∧, W (x) =
∨
J∈J
∧
i∈J Vi(x) is written as a Boolean polynomial in
disjunctive normal form.
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Aumann acts that satisfy all of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) axioms except for uncertainty
aversion (Theorem 1). Equivalently, the presence of ambiguity is captured solely by relaxing
independence to certainty independence, without additionally restricting the DM’s ambigu-
ity attitude to be negative (or positive). Obtaining an easy-to-interpret representation for
this class of preferences—which are known as invariant biseparable—has been considered an
important question in the ambiguity literature. Section 4.2 contrasts BEU with existing rep-
resentations due to Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) (generalized α-maxmin)
and Amarante (2009) (Choquet integration over beliefs).
Proposition 1 shows that any BEU preference % uniquely reveals a set of relevant priors
C =
⋃
P∈P P , which represents the possible outcomes of the belief-selection game.
5 Moreover,
C admits a behavioral characterization in terms of the extent to which % departs from
independence, in the sense that it coincides with Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci’s
(2004) unanimity representation of the largest independent subrelation of %.
Exploiting the fact that BEU allows for flexible attitudes towards ambiguity, our sec-
ond main contribution is to use BEU to represent and contrast a range of theoretically and
experimentally appealing ambiguity attitudes. We begin by showing that the standard com-
parative notion of ambiguity aversion is represented by a natural preorder over collections
P of sets of beliefs, which captures the relative power allocated to Pessimism in the belief-
selection game (Proposition 2). While for a given set of relevant priors, maxmin and maxmax
expected utility are maximal and minimal in this order, the result highlights how less ex-
treme allocations of power across the selves can generate a rich hierarchy of intermediate
ambiguity attitudes, which we proceed to characterize in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
First, Theorem 2 shows that several different shades of ambiguity aversion—as captured
by varying degrees of preference for hedging—are characterized by the extent of overlap
of sets in P. Specifically, Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2002) notion of absolute ambiguity
aversion (i.e., being more ambiguity-averse than some subjective expected utility preference),
which corresponds to a preference for complete hedges that fully eliminate uncertainty, is
characterized by the intersection of all sets in P being nonempty. This requires there to be
at least one prior that is always available to Pessimism regardless of Optimism’s choice, and
hence is strictly weaker than uncertainty aversion (i.e., a preference for all hedges), which
requires that all relevant priors are always available to Pessimism. Since absolute ambiguity
aversion is inconsistent with experimental evidence that subjects are often ambiguity-averse
for bets involving moderate odds but ambiguity-seeking for small odds, we also consider the
even weaker notion of k-ambiguity aversion (for some k = 2, 3, . . .) and show that it can
accommodate this evidence. This notion imposes a preference for complete hedges only
5Uniqueness holds up to convex closure and elimination of redundant (never selected) beliefs.
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among any k acts and is characterized by the requirement that the intersection of any k sets
in P is nonempty.
Second, motivated by experimental findings that subjects’ ambiguity attitudes may be
negative or positive depending on their familiarity with the source of uncertainty, we further
relax k-ambiguity aversion to a “local” analog, which characterizes the sign of an event-
based ambiguity aversion index commonly used in experimental work. While BEU can
accommodate source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes by allowing the
sign of this index to vary across events (Proposition 3), we show that this phenomenon is
incompatible with its widely used special case, α-maxmin.
Finally, Section 4.1 introduces some natural extensions of BEU that relax certainty inde-
pendence to weaker axioms, accommodating additional experimental findings. The resulting
representations are also Boolean, in the sense that they feature a game between Optimism
and Pessimism with more general payoffs. This suggests that Boolean models provide a
unified way of representing ambiguity preferences that depart from independence, without
restricting the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude.
2 Boolean Expected Utility
2.1 Setup
Let Z be a set of prizes and let ∆(Z) denote the space of simple lotteries (that is, probability
measures with finite support) over Z. We refer to typical elements p, q ∈ ∆(Z) as lotteries.
Let S be a finite set of states. An (Anscombe-Aumann) act is a mapping f : S → ∆(Z).
Let F be the space of all acts, with typical elements f, g, h. For any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1],
define the mixture αf + (1 − α)g ∈ F to be the act that in each state s ∈ S yields lottery
αf(s) + (1− α)g(s) ∈ ∆(Z). As usual, we identify each lottery p ∈ ∆(Z) with the constant
act that yields lottery p in each state s ∈ S.
Let ∆(S) denote the set of all probability measures over S, which we embed in RS and
endow with the Euclidean topology. We refer to typical elements µ, ν ∈ ∆(S) as beliefs.
Given any act f ∈ F and map u : ∆(Z) → R, let u(f) denote the element of RS given by
u(f)(s) = u(f(s)) for all s ∈ S, and let Eµ[u(f)] := µ · u(f).
The DM’s preference over F is given by a binary relation % on F . As usual, ≻ and ∼
denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %.
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2.2 Representation
We now introduce our baseline representation, Boolean expected utility. Let K(∆(S)) denote
the space of all nonempty closed, convex sets of beliefs, endowed with the Hausdorff topology.
A belief-set collection is a nonempty compact collection P ⊆ K(∆(S)); that is, each
element P ∈ P is a nonempty closed, convex set of beliefs.
Definition 1. A Boolean expected utility (BEU) representation of preference % consists
of a belief-set collection P and a nonconstant affine utility u : ∆(Z)→ R such that
WBEU(f) = max
P∈P
min
µ∈P
Eµ[u(f)] (1)
represents %.6
Just as Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility model, BEU is a multiple-
prior model of ambiguity: The DM has in mind a set of relevant beliefs
⋃
P∈P P , and might
use a different belief to evaluate each act. But unlike maxmin expected utility, the belief
µ used to evaluate any given act f is not necessarily worst-case among all relevant beliefs.
Instead, µ is the outcome of a sequential zero-sum game between two conflicting forces or
“selves:” First, self 1 (“Optimism”) chooses an action P ∈ P with the goal of maximizing
expected utility to act f ; then self 2 (“Pessimism”) chooses an action µ ∈ P with the goal of
minimizing expected utility to f .
As Remark 1 below shows, both the specific form of action sets and the order of moves
in (1) are without loss of generality. Note that maxmin expected utility corresponds to the
extreme special case of BEU where Optimism’s action set is trivial (i.e., P = {P} is a sin-
gleton), as in this case (1) reduces to W (f) = minµ∈P Eµ[u(f)]. Likewise, maxmax expected
utility, W (f) = maxµ∈P Eµ[u(f)], corresponds to the opposite extreme where Pessimism’s
action set is always trivial (i.e., P = {{µ} : µ ∈ P} is a collection of singletons).
Our first main result is that BEU represents the class of preferences that satisfy all subjec-
tive expected utility axioms, except that independence is relaxed to certainty independence:
Axiom 1 (Weak Order). % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). If f, g ∈ F and f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f % g.
Axiom 3 (Nondegeneracy). There exist f, g ∈ F such that f ≻ g.
Axiom 4 (Archimedean). For all f, g, h ∈ F with f ≻ g ≻ h, there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such
that
αf + (1− α)h ≻ g ≻ βf + (1− β)h.
6The functional (1) is well-defined since P is nonempty and compact.
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Axiom 5 (Certainty Independence). For all f, g ∈ F , p ∈ ∆(Z), and α ∈ (0, 1],
f % g ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)p % αg + (1− α)p.
Theorem 1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if % admits a BEU representa-
tion.
Thus, like maxmin expected utility, BEU captures the possible presence of ambiguity
by imposing independence only for mixtures with constant acts, i.e., mixtures that apply
equally to all states.7 However, unlike maxmin expected utility, BEU does not additionally
impose uncertainty aversion, which reflects a negative attitude toward ambiguity through a
preference for hedging (see Axiom 6).
Theorem 1 shows that BEU provides a novel, easy-to-interpret representation of the class
of preferences that Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) (henceforth GMM) term
invariant biseparable. In Section 4.2, we contrast BEU with existing representations due to
GMM and Amarante (2009). In addition, Section 4.1 shows that natural generalizations of
BEU represent classes of preferences that further relax certainty independence.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B.1. We first invoke the well-known fact that % satisfies
Axioms 1–5 if and only if % can be represented by I ◦ u for some nonconstant affine utility
u and a functional I : RS → R that is monotonic, positively homogeneous, and constant-
additive (Appendix A.1 defines these terms). For the sufficiency direction of the proof, we
then make use of the Clarke differential ∂I(0) ⊆ ∆(S) of I at the constant vector 0 (Clarke,
1990, see Appendix A.2). The key step, which we discuss in Remark 1(iv) below, is to show
that the belief-set collection P∗ given by
P∗ := cl{P ∗φ : φ ∈ R
S} with P ∗φ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : Eµ[φ] ≥ I(φ)} (2)
yields a BEU representation of I, i.e., for all φ ∈ RS,
I(φ) = max
P∈P∗
min
µ∈P
Eµ[φ]. (3)
Remark 1. (i) General action sets. The specific form of action sets for Optimism and
Pessimism in (1) is without loss of generality. Indeed, % admits a BEU representation with
utility u if and only if there exist arbitrary action sets A1, A2 and a mapping µ : A1×A2 →
7See Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2005), who argue why certainty independence is important
for achieving a separation of tastes and beliefs.
6
∆(S) from action profiles to beliefs such that
W (f) = max
a1∈A1
min
a2∈A2
Eµ(a1,a2)[u(f)] (4)
is well-defined and represents %.8
(ii) Min-max form. While BEU takes the max-min form in which Optimism is the
first mover, it is equivalent to consider representations of the min-max form. That is, %
admits a BEU representation if and only if it can be represented by the functional W (f) =
minQ∈Qmaxµ∈Q Eµ[u(f)] for some belief-set collection Q. However, the collection Q need not
coincide with P in general. See Supplementary Appendix S.2 for more details.
(iii) Single-self interpretation. In addition to the dual-self interpretation above, BEU
admits a single-self interpretation, whereby the DM optimally selects her own ambiguity
preference from a feasible set.9 Specifically, feasible ambiguity preferences take the maxmin
expected utility form minµ∈P Eµ[u(f)] and depending on f , the DM optimally controls the
parameter P , where P represents the constraints of the subjective optimization.
(iv) Relationship with mathematics literature. Equation (3) relates to recent re-
sults on the linearization of positively homogeneous functions, which imply that a functional
I : RS → R admits a representation of the form I(φ) = maxU∈Uminℓ∈U ℓ · φ for some col-
lection U of compact, convex subsets of RS if and only if I is positively homogeneous, lower
semicontinuous, and locally Lipschitz (see the survey by Rubinov and Dzalilov, 2002). Our
proof shows that under the additional assumption that I is monotonic and constant-additive,
U can be taken to be a belief-set collection. More importantly, our construction only makes
use of beliefs µ in the Clarke differential ∂I(0), which represents precisely the set of priors
considered relevant by the DM (see Section 2.3). This requires a different proof approach,
which builds partly on a non-smooth generalization of Ovchinnikov (2001), who shows that
continuously differentiable functionals I admit Boolean representations in terms of affine
functionals whose slopes are gradients of I (see Appendix A.3). N
2.3 Relevant Priors
A natural way to identify the DM’s set of relevant priors under BEU is to consider the
union
⋃
P∈P P of all sets in the belief-set collection. This captures all possible outcomes of
the belief-selection game between Optimism and Pessimism. To eliminate redundant beliefs
8To see this, suppose (P, u) is a BEU representation of %. Then (4) represents % with A1 := P, A2 :=∏
P∈P P , and µ(P, σ) := σ(P ) for all P ∈ A1, σ ∈ A2. Conversely, suppose (4) represents % for some
(A1, A2, µ, u). Then setting P := {co(µ(a1, A2)) : a1 ∈ A1} yields a BEU representation of %.
9See Sarver (2018) for an analogous model in the context of risk preferences.
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that are never selected, we focus on the smallest closed, convex set of beliefs that can arise
under any BEU representation. Proposition 1 shows that this set is uniquely identified:
Proposition 1. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. There exists a unique closed, convex set
C ⊆ ∆(S) such that
C ⊆ co
⋃
P∈P
P (5)
for all BEU representations (P, u) of % and such that (5) holds with equality for some (P, u).
We call a BEU representation tight if (5) holds with equality. To prove Proposition 1
(Appendix B.2), we show that for any BEU representation, co
⋃
P∈P P includes the Clarke
differential ∂I(0) at 0 of the functional I from the proof of Theorem 1. Since the represen-
tation P∗ in (2) satisfies co
⋃
P∈P∗ P = ∂I(0), this implies that the set of relevant priors C is
precisely ∂I(0) and that P∗ is a tight representation.
An implication of this Clarke-differential characterization of C is that our definition of the
DM’s relevant priors as the possible outcomes of the belief-selection game is equivalent to the
following behavioral definition due to GMM, which is based on quantifying departures from
independence. For any preference % satisfying Axioms 1–5, GMM define the unambiguous
preference %∗ as the largest independent subrelation of %; equivalently, f %∗ g means that
αf + (1− α)h % αg + (1− α)h holds for all α ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F .
Note that %∗ is incomplete whenever % violates independence. GMM show that %∗
admits a unanimity representation à la Bewley (2002) and identify the unique closed, convex
set of priors in the unanimity representation as the DM’s relevant set of priors.10 Since GMM
show that the latter set again coincides with ∂I(0), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If % admits a BEU representation with utility u, then the set of relevant priors
C is the unique closed, convex set such that
f %∗ g ⇐⇒ Eµ[u(f)] ≥ Eµ[u(g)] for all µ ∈ C. (6)
Remark 2 (Uniqueness). Our results in the remainder of this note apply to all BEU repre-
sentations of a given preference, and thus do not require unique identification of a particular
representation. Nevertheless, standard arguments imply that the utility u under BEU is
unique up to positive affine transformation. Moreover, Supplementary Appendix S.1 shows
that the belief-set collection P is unique up to “half-space closure,” analogous to recent rep-
resentations featuring collections of sets of utilities (e.g., Hara, Ok, and Riella, 2019). N
10Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) take an alternative approach by including %∗
as part of the primitive. Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012) extend GMM’s characterization of relevant
priors beyond the invariant biseparable class. See Klibanoff, Mukerji, and Seo (2014) for a discussion of the
interpretation of C.
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3 Ambiguity Attitude
In this section, we highlight that BEU provides a unified framework through which to rep-
resent and contrast different attitudes toward ambiguity.
3.1 Comparative Ambiguity Attitude
Recall the standard comparative notion of ambiguity aversion (Ghirardato and Marinacci,
2002), whereby %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 if whenever f %1 p for some f ∈ F
and p ∈ ∆(Z), then f %2 p. We begin by showing that under BEU, this is represented by a
preorder over belief-set collections which captures the relative “power” allocated to Pessimism
in the belief-selection game.
Formally, write P1 ⊒ P2 if
for all P1 ∈ P1 there exists P2 ∈ P2 with P1 ⊇ P2.
To interpret, if P1 ⊒ P2, then for any potential move P1 of Optimism under P1, Optimism
has a move P2 ⊆ P1 in P2 that restricts Pessimism’s action set more. Thus, Pessimism’s
relative power to influence the DM’s belief is weaker under collection P2 than under P1.
11
Proposition 2. Suppose %1, %2 admit BEU representations. The following are equivalent:
1. %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2.
2. %1 admits a BEU representation (P1, u1) such that every BEU representation (P2, u2)
of %2 satisfies P1 ⊒ P2 and u1 ≈ u2.
The proof exhibits a representation Pˆi of %i that ⊒-dominates any other representation,
and shows that %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 if and only if Pˆ1 ⊒ Pˆ2. Note that
Proposition 2 does not assume any relationship between the sets of relevant priors C1 and C2
associated with %1 and %2. This is in contrast with GMM’s characterization of comparative
ambiguity aversion, which requires the assumption that C1 = C2 (Proposition 12 in GMM).
While for a given set of relevant priors C, maxmin expected utility (P = {C}) and
maxmax expected utility (P = {{µ} : µ ∈ C}) represent the most and least ambiguity-averse
BEU representations, the following two subsections proceed to characterize a hierarchy of
intermediate ambiguity attitudes that correspond to less extreme allocations of power across
the two selves.
11An alternative, stronger order over belief-set collections is given by set inclusion, P1 ⊆ P2. One can
show that this represents comparative ambiguity aversion in the following weaker sense: Suppose %1, %2
admit BEU representations. Then %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 if and only if there exist BEU
representations (Pi, ui) of %i that satisfy P1 ⊆ P2 and u1 ≈ u2.
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3.2 Shades of Ambiguity Aversion
Existing decision-theoretic definitions of ambiguity aversion postulate a preference for hedg-
ing, or randomization, but vary in the degree to which they impose this attitude. The
seminal axiom in this literature, Schmeidler’s (1989) uncertainty aversion, postulates that
the DM always takes up an opportunity to hedge between two equally valued prospects.
Axiom 6 (Uncertainty Aversion). If f, g ∈ F with f ∼ g, then
1
2
f +
1
2
g % f .
The second standard definition is Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2002) notion of absolute
ambiguity aversion, which relies on the comparative definition considered in the previous
section. Analogous to the definition of absolutely risk-averse as more risk-averse than a risk-
neutral preference, % is said to be absolutely ambiguity-averse if it is more ambiguity-
averse than some nondegenerate subjective expected utility preference.12
Our main result in this section contrasts these two formalizations of ambiguity aversion
under BEU, as well as the following third notion:
Axiom 7 (k-Ambiguity Aversion). For all f1, ..., fk ∈ F with f1 ∼ f2 ∼ · · · ∼ fk and any
p ∈ ∆(Z),
1
k
f1 + · · ·+
1
k
fk = p =⇒ p % f1.
Axiom 7 only imposes a preference for complete hedging between k equally valued
prospects, that is, for hedges that eliminate subjective uncertainty entirely. We say that
% satisfies ∞-ambiguity aversion if it satisfies k-ambiguity aversion for all k. This corre-
sponds to the notion of preference for sure diversification used by Chateauneuf and Tallon
(2002) to characterize absolute ambiguity aversion under Choquet expected utility. Argu-
ments in Grant and Polak (2013) imply that this characterization extends to BEU; moreover,
we note that |S|-ambiguity aversion is sufficient for ∞-ambiguity aversion (where |S| is the
cardinality of the state space):
Lemma 1. Suppose % admits a BEU representation. The following are equivalent: (i) %
is absolutely ambiguity-averse; (ii) % satisfies ∞-ambiguity aversion; (iii) % satisfies |S|-
ambiguity aversion.
We now show that under BEU, the above notions of ambiguity aversion are characterized
by the degree of overlap of sets in P, capturing successively less power allocated to Pessimism:
Theorem 2. Suppose that % admits a BEU representation (P, u). Then:
12See Epstein (1999) for another approach that takes as its benchmark probabilistic sophistication instead
of subjective expected utility.
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1. % satisfies uncertainty aversion if and only if
⋂
P∈P
P = C;
2. % is absolutely ambiguity-averse if and only if
⋂
P∈P
P 6= ∅;
3. % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion if and only if
⋂
i=1,...,k
Pi 6= ∅ for all P1, ..., Pk ∈ P.
Uncertainty aversion corresponds to the maximal allocation of power to Pessimism, in
the sense that all relevant priors µ ∈ C are available to Pessimism regardless of which set P
Optimism chooses. The game thus boils down to Pessimism choosing a belief µ ∈ C, yielding
maxmin expected utility; indeed, note that if (P, u) is tight, then % satisfies uncertainty
aversion if and only if P = {C}.
Absolute ambiguity aversion allocates less power to Pessimism, requiring only that there
is some prior µ ∈
⋂
P∈P P that is always available to Pessimism regardless of Optimism’s
choice. Thus, the DM’s valuation of any act f is bounded above by the expected utility
Eµ[u(f)] of f under prior µ, which implies that % is more ambiguity-averse than the expected
utility preference with belief µ and utility u.
Finally, while absolute ambiguity aversion requires the intersection of all sets in P to be
nonempty, k-ambiguity aversion imposes this only for any k sets in P. Thus, k-ambiguity
aversion further decreases the power allocated to Pessimism, and more so the smaller k.
Indeed, whenever k-ambiguity aversion holds at P1, then any representation P2 ⊒ P1 displays
a weakly higher degree of k-ambiguity aversion.
The relevance of further relaxing the DM’s negative ambiguity attitude in this manner is
underscored by experimental evidence. Indeed, one notable pattern suggesting that subjects’
preferences might be better described by k-ambiguity aversion for small k than for large k is
ambiguity seeking for small odds, which was originally conjectured by Ellsberg (e.g., Ellsberg,
2011) and subsequently confirmed in laboratory experiments:13
Example 1 (Ellsberg urn with many colors). Consider an urn with 10 balls with unknown
composition from up to 10 different colors. A ball is drawn from the urn and its color
observed. State space S = {1, · · · , 10} represents the observed color. For each event E ⊆ S,
let fE denote the uncertain bet that pays $10 if the color of the ball belongs to E and $0
otherwise, and let pα denote the objective lottery that pays $10 with probability α and $0
otherwise.
When the cardinality of E is 5, this setting is similar to Ellsberg’s two-color urn experi-
ment, suggesting a preference for the objective lottery p0.5 over the uncertain bet fE, consis-
tent with 2-ambiguity aversion. However, when E is a singleton event, many subjects prefer
13Dillenberger and Segal (2017) show that a version of Segal’s (1987) model is consistent with this evidence.
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fE to the corresponding objective lottery p0.1 (e.g., Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and
Peijnenburg, 2015; Kocher, Lahno, and Trautmann, 2018). Assuming that f{1} ∼ . . . ∼ f{10}
by symmetry, this contradicts 10-ambiguity aversion as p0.1 =
1
10
f{1} + · · ·
1
10
f{10}. N
The following simple example illustrates that BEU allows for flexible degrees of k-
ambiguity aversion and hence can accommodate the aforementioned experimental evidence.
This contrasts, for instance, with Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility model, which
also relaxes uncertainty aversion, but for which 2-ambiguity aversion and∞-ambiguity aver-
sion are equivalent.14
Example 2. Consider a BEU representation (P, u) of the form P = {Ps : s ∈ S} where for
some fixed ǫ ≥ 0,
Ps := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(s) ≥ ǫ}
for each s. For each k ≤ |S|, Theorem 2 implies that k-ambiguity aversion is satisfied if and
only if ǫ ≤ 1
k
.15 N
3.3 Ambiguity Aversion Index and Source Dependence
While the preceding notions of ambiguity aversion are “global,” capturing the DM’s attitude
towards any uncertainty that can be generated in S, the experimental literature commonly
takes a “local” approach, measuring the DM’s ambiguity attitude relative to specific events
or sources of uncertainty.
A primary local measure of ambiguity attitudes is based on the following idea originally
proposed by Schmeidler (1989) and subsequently employed in both theoretical work (Dow
and Werlang, 1992) and in experiments (Baillon and Bleichrodt, 2015; Baillon, Huang, Selim,
and Wakker, 2018). Given any event E ⊆ S, we first define its matching probability
m(E) ∈ [0, 1] by the indifference condition
xEy ∼ m(E)δx + (1−m(E))δy,
where x, y ∈ Z are two outcomes such that δx ≻ δy and xEy denotes the binary act that
yields x for all s ∈ E and y otherwise.16 Based on this, define the ambiguity aversion
14Note that 2-ambiguity aversion is equivalent to Siniscalchi’s (2009) Axiom 11, which he shows is equiv-
alent to absolute ambiguity aversion (provided utilities are unbounded).
15To see this, suppose ǫ ≤ 1
k
. Then for any s1, ..., sk, we have
1
k
δs1+· · ·
1
k
δsk ∈ ∩
k
i=1Psi , so that k-ambiguity
aversion holds. Conversely, if ǫ > 1
k
, take any distinct s1, ..., sk. If µ ∈
⋂k
i=1 Psi , then µ(si) >
1
k
for all
i = 1, ..., k, contradicting µ ∈ ∆(S). Thus,
⋂k
i=1 Psi = ∅, so that k-ambiguity aversion fails.
16Under Axioms 1–5, m(·) is well-defined independent of the choice of x, y.
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index associated with E by
AA(E) := 1−m(E)−m(Ec). (7)
Whereas subjective expected utility implies AA(E) = 0 for all E, AA(E) > 0 (resp. AA(E) <
0) is interpreted as a negative (resp. positive) attitude to ambiguity associated with E. Note
that this index can be defined for any event, without imposing symmetry on the state space
as is common in urn experiments.
Under BEU, the sign of AA(E) is characterized by the following local analog of the binary
intersection condition for 2-ambiguity aversion in Theorem 2:
Lemma 2. Suppose % admits a BEU representation (P, u). Then for any E ⊆ S,
AA(E) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ PE ∩ P
′
E 6= ∅ for all P, P
′ ∈ P,
where PE := {µ(E) : µ ∈ P}.
As a result, 2-ambiguity aversion implies AA(E) ≥ 0 for all events E. As such, 2-
ambiguity aversion may still be too restrictive to accommodate experimental evidence that
subjects who display negative ambiguity attitudes for “unfamiliar” events (i.e., when they feel
less competent about the relevant domain of uncertainty) sometimes display less negative,
or even positive, attitudes for familiar events. For example, among German subjects, Keppe
and Weber (1995) find a positive average ambiguity aversion index for bets concerning US
geography, but a negative average index for bets concerning German geography. This can be
seen as a manifestation of source dependence, i.e., the idea that agents’ ambiguity attitudes
vary across sources of uncertainty.17 The following is a stylized example in the context of
home bias (French and Poterba, 1991):
Example 3 (Home bias). Let SH = {U,D} be a state space specifying whether the domestic
stock market goes up (“U”) or down (“D”). Similarly, let SF = {U,D} describe the state of
the stock market in a foreign country. Consider the product state space S = SH×SF , and let
EH = {UU,UD} be the event that the domestic stock market goes up, and EF = {UU,DU}
be the corresponding event for the foreign stock market. Under source dependence, investors
17See, e.g., Heath and Tversky (1991); Fox and Tversky (1995); Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker
(2011); Chew, Miao, and Zhong (2018) for related experimental evidence. Several papers (e.g., Nau, 2006;
Chew and Sagi, 2008; Ergin and Gul, 2009; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2015; Cappelli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Minardi, 2016) propose formalizations of source dependence based on the idea that the DM
is probabilistically sophisticated over prospects that depend on a single common source, but exhibits varying
attitudes toward uncertainty across sources. Our focus in this section is a specific form of variation where
the DM exhibits negative vs. positive ambiguity attitudes depending on his familiarity with each source.
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may display a higher ambiguity aversion index for foreign than domestic stock; indeed,
some may reverse the sign, AA(EF ) > 0 > AA(EH), i.e., be ambiguity-seeking for EH but
ambiguity-averse for EF .
18 N
The following result shows that BEU can accommodate the home bias in Example 3; in-
deed, it can capture source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes with respect
to any families E and F of unfamiliar and familiar events:
Proposition 3. Fix any disjoint collections E and F of events, both of which are closed under
complements and do not contain S. There exists a preference % satisfying Axioms 1–5 such
that AA(E) > 0 > AA(F ) for all E ∈ E , F ∈ F .
Proposition 3 highlights an important distinction with a special case of BEU, α-maxmin
expected utility, which represents preferences by the functional
W (f) = αmin
µ∈P
Eµ[u(f)] + (1− α)max
ν∈P
Eν [u(f)]
for some α ∈ [0, 1], nonempty closed, convex set of beliefs P , and nonconstant affine u.
Due to its tractability, α-maxmin is often used in applied theoretical work or for analyzing
experimental data.19 However, while α-maxmin can accommodate flexible degrees of k-
ambiguity aversion (based on the same idea as Example 2), Lemma 2 implies that this model
is inconsistent with source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes. Indeed, the
sign of the ambiguity index is the same for all events and is determined by the value of α:
Corollary 2. Suppose % admits an α-maxmin representation where P is not a singleton.
Then α ≥ 1/2 (resp. α ≤ 1/2) if and only if AA(E) ≥ 0 (resp. AA(E) ≤ 0) for all E.
More strongly, one can show that α ≥ 1
2
implies 2-ambiguity aversion while α ≤ 1
2
implies
2-ambiguity seeking (as defined in Supplementary Appendix S.2).
At the same time, we highlight another special case of BEU that retains much of the
tractability of α-maxmin, but allows for source-dependent negative and positive ambiguity
attitudes as in Example 3. Specifically, consider a simple generalization of α-maxmin that
allows for different sets of beliefs P1 and P2 for the max and min operator, i.e.,
W (f) = αmin
µ∈P1
Eµ[u(f)] + (1− α)max
ν∈P2
Eν [u(f)].
18In an incentivized field survey among investors, Anantanasuwong, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnen-
berg (2019) (Figures 4 and 5) find reversals as in Example 3, where H and F correspond to a domestic
and foreign stock market index. They also find a higher population average AA index for EF than EH ,
although the difference is relatively small, as some investors display the opposite reversal (which can also be
accommodated by BEU).
19Many applications use the representation characterized by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007),
i.e., the special case of α-maxmin where P is a convex combination of a fixed prior π and ∆(S).
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To capture Example 3, we can set P1 := {µ : µ(EH) =
1
2
} and P2 := {µ : µ(EF ) =
1
2
}.
This implies AA(EH) = α − 1 < 0 and AA(EF ) = α > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1), thereby generating
negative ambiguity attitudes for foreign events and positive attitudes for home events.
Remark 3. While in practice index (7) is typically defined using matching probabilities on
binary partitions {E,Ec}, it can be generalized to arbitrary partitions E of S by setting
AA(E) = 1−
∑
E∈E
m(E).
Given this, k-ambiguity aversion implies that AA(E) ≥ 0 for all E with |E| ≤ k.20 Thus, the
aforementioned evidence on ambiguity seeking for small odds suggests the need to allow the
sign of AA(E) to depend on the number of events in partition E . Example 2 can accommodate
this, as the index satisfies AA(E) = 1− ǫ|E| for any non-trivial partition E . N
4 Discussion
4.1 Generalizations
As we have seen, our baseline model, BEU, corresponds to a relaxation of subjective expected
utility where independence is weakened to certainty independence and, equivalently, to drop-
ping uncertainty aversion from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) axioms. The representation
adds a maximization stage to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), admitting an interpretation in
terms of a game between Optimism and Pessimism.
We highlight that this approach generalizes beyond certainty independence, yielding in-
tuitive representations that further relax independence but still do not impose uncertainty
aversion. To illustrate, Supplementary Appendix S.3 shows that replacing certainty inde-
pendence with weak certainty independence (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006)
yields a representation of the form
W (f) = max
c∈C
min
µ∈∆(S)
Eµ[u(f)] + c(µ), (8)
where Optimism first chooses a convex cost function c : ∆(S)→ R ∪ {∞} from a collection
C that is grounded (i.e., maxc∈Cminµ∈∆(S) c(µ) = 0) and Pessimism then chooses a belief
subject to this cost.21 This adds a maximization stage into Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
20The proof follows from Lemma C.1 in the appendix.
21A special case of (8), imposing the stronger requirement that minµ∈∆(S) c(µ) = 0 for all c ∈ C, appears
in the conclusion of Castagnoli, Cattelan, Maccheroni, and Tebaldi (in preparation), who note that this
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Rustichini’s (2006) variational model, which corresponds to the special case that additionally
satisfies uncertainty aversion. An even weaker form of independence, which applies only to
objective lotteries, leads to a representation with general game payoffs, extending Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio’s (2011) uncertainty-averse representation
(see Supplementary Appendix S.4).22
Further relaxing independence in this manner is motivated by additional experimental ev-
idence. For instance, representation (8), which relaxes the positive homogeneity of I implied
by certainty independence while preserving constant-additivity, can accommodate Machina’s
(2009) paradoxes (see also Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido, 2011).23 Another important find-
ing is that ambiguity attitudes can differ for gains and losses, e.g., in urn experiments subjects
who are ambiguity-averse for bets with positive payoffs are often ambiguity-seeking when the
sign of the bet is reversed (Trautmann and Wakker, 2018). The latter finding is inconsistent
with any representation that displays constant-additivity, but can be accommodated by our
most general model in Supplementary Appendix S.4.
4.2 Related Literature
This note makes two main contributions to the decision-theoretic literature on preferences
under ambiguity (for a survey, see Gilboa and Marinacci, 2016). First, we propose a class of
multiple-prior representations, BEU and its extensions, that do not impose the worst-case
belief selection mechanism implied by uncertainty aversion and instead model beliefs as the
outcome of a game between Pessimism and Optimism. Second, we use BEU to characterize
a hierarchy of natural intermediate ambiguity attitudes.
Our first contribution, in particular the finding that BEU represents the class of invariant
biseparable preferences, relates to GMM and Amarante (2009). GMM propose the first
representation of invariant biseparable preferences, which takes an act-dependent α-maxmin
form,
W (f) = α(f)min
µ∈C
Eµ[u(f)] + (1− α(f))max
µ∈C
Eµ[u(f)], (9)
where C is the set of priors in the Bewley representation (6) of the unambiguous preference
%∗ and α(·) is a function from acts to [0, 1]. Importantly, α(·)must satisfy several restrictions
to ensure necessity of the axioms: Specifically, α(·) must be measurable with respect to a
special case is characterized by the following axiom in addition to our axioms: for all f ∈ F , p ∈ ∆(Z) and
α ∈ (0, 1), f % p =⇒ αf + (1− α)p % p (F. Maccheroni, personal communication, June 2019).
22Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2011) provide an alternative repre-
sentation of this class of preferences, which generalizes GMM by imposing weaker restrictions on the weight
function α(·) in (9) below.
23This follows from the fact that Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility model can accommodate these
paradoxes and is a special case of (8).
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particular derived equivalence relation ≍ over acts and α(·) must be such that the preference
represented by (9) is monotonic (see Remark 2 in GMM).24 Amarante (2009) provides an
alternative representation via the functional
W (f) =
ˆ
∆(S)
Eµ[u(f)] dν(µ),
which captures a DM who holds first-order beliefs µ ∈ ∆(S) that are probability measures,
but faces second-order uncertainty over first-order beliefs that takes the form of a Choquet
capacity ν.
BEU is closer to GMM, in that both representations induce act-dependent beliefs that are
jointly influenced by Optimism and Pessimism. However, while (9) imposes act dependence
exogenously through the weights α(·) on max and min, the act-dependent belief selection
under BEU can be interpreted endogenously, as the outcome of a sequential game between
Optimism and Pessimism. More importantly, in contrast with the aforementioned restric-
tions on α(·), necessity of the axioms under BEU requires no additional restrictions on the
belief-set collection P.
Our second contribution of using BEU to characterize a hierarchy of intermediate ambi-
guity attitudes has no counterpart in GMM or Amarante (2009). This is also an important
difference from other models that relax uncertainty aversion, including Schmeidler’s (1989)
Choquet expected utility, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) smooth model, and
models of preferences over utility dispersion (e.g., Siniscalchi, 2009; Grant and Polak, 2013):
While some of these papers provide representations of absolute ambiguity aversion, none use
their models to characterize weaker degrees of ambiguity aversion.25
Related to the structure of BEU, several recent papers employ belief-set or utility-set
collections in other contexts. While we maintain the weak order axiom and focus on relaxing
independence, Lehrer and Teper (2011) and Nascimento and Riella (2011) (resp. Hara, Ok,
and Riella, 2019) represent preferences over acts (resp. lotteries) that violate completeness
and/or transitivity. Whereas BEU is a utility representation, these papers provide general-
ized unanimity representations à la Bewley (2002) and Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004),
24GMM also characterize the special case of (9) where α(·) is constant, i.e., the subclass of α-maxmin
representations whose set of priors P coincides with the induced Bewley set C. Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey,
and Koshevoy (2011) show that if the state space is finite, this representation reduces to maxmin or max-
max. Siniscalchi (2006) axiomatizes a special case of invariant biseparable preferences that have a piecewise
subjective expected utility form.
25Absolute ambiguity aversion is equivalent to concavity of the function φ that aggregates expected utilities
across different priors in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) smooth model; to non-emptiness of the
capacity’s core under Choquet expected utility; and to non-positivity of the adjustment function under
Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility model.
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and the resulting proof methods are quite different. In the context of attitudes to random-
ization under ambiguity, Ke and Zhang (2019) consider preferences over lotteries over acts
and propose a representation that adds minimization over belief-set collections to maxmin
expected utility. When restricted to acts (i.e., degenerate lotteries), their representation is
equivalent to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Beyond the ambiguity literature, BEU is related to Hart, Modica, and Schmeidler (1994),
who provide a preference foundation for maxmin values in zero-sum games. They consider a
product state space S = S1×S2, where S1 and S2 are interpreted as the DM’s and opponent’s
action sets. They characterize when preferences over acts can be represented as the maxmin
value of a simultaneous-move zero-sum game,
W (f) = max
µ1∈∆(S1)
min
µ2∈∆(S2)
∑
s1,s2
µ1(s1)µ2(s2)u(f(s1, s2)),
which is formally a strict special case of BEU.
Finally, we note the independent and contemporaneous work by Chandrasekher (2019),
who characterizes the special case of BEU with finitely many sets of priors by additionally
imposing a weak form of uncertainty aversion.26 His motivation is to study a notion of source
dependence which requires the matching probabilities of events belonging to one (e.g., famil-
iar) source to be higher than those of events belonging to another (e.g., unfamiliar) source.
This is different from our focus in Section 3.3 on positive vs. negative ambiguity aversion
indices for familiar vs. unfamiliar events. Whereas we show that the latter is incompatible
with α-maxmin, his notion is in general compatible even with uncertainty aversion.
Appendix: Proofs
A Preliminaries
Throughout this section, we fix any interval Γ ⊆ R and let U := ΓS. For any a ∈ R, let
a denote the vector in RS with a(s) = a for all s ∈ S. For any φ, ψ ∈ RS, write φ ≥ ψ if
φ(s) ≥ ψ(s) for all s.
26His proof approach is quite different from ours, and while as an intermediate step, he obtains a general
BEU representation when weak uncertainty aversion is dropped, the resulting representation is not tight,
i.e.,
⋃
P∈P P is strictly larger than the set of relevant priors.
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A.1 Properties of functionals
Fix any functional I : U → R. We call I: monotonic if I(φ) ≥ I(ψ) for all φ, ψ ∈ U
with φ ≥ ψ; normalized if I(a) = a for all a ∈ Γ; constant-additive if I(φ + a) = I(φ) + a
for all φ ∈ U and a ∈ Γ with φ + a ∈ U ; positively homogeneous if I(aφ) = aI(φ) for
all φ ∈ U and a ∈ R+ with aφ ∈ U ; and constant-linear if I is constant-additive and
positively homogeneous. It is easy to see that if 0 ∈ Γ, then any constant-linear functional
I is normalized.
A.2 Clarke derivative and differential
Consider a locally Lipschitz functional I : U → R. For every φ ∈ intU and ξ ∈ RS, the
Clarke (upper) derivative of I in φ in the direction of ξ is
I◦(φ; ξ) := lim sup
ψ→φ,t↓0
I(ψ + tξ)− I(ψ)
t
.
The Clarke (sub)differential of I at φ is the set
∂I(φ) := {χ ∈ RS : χ · ξ ≤ I◦(φ; ξ), ∀ξ ∈ RS}.
We will frequently invoke the following properties of the Clarke differential. First, if I is
locally Lipschitz, then Rademacher’s theorem yields a subset Uˆ ⊆ intU such that U \ Uˆ has
Lebesgue measure zero and I is differentiable on Uˆ . Combining this with Theorem 2.5.1 in
Clarke (1990), we obtain the following approximation of the Clarke differential:
Lemma A.1 (Theorem 2.5.1 in Clarke (1990)). Suppose I : U → R is locally Lipschitz.
Then there exists Uˆ ⊆ intU such that U \ Uˆ has Lebesgue measure zero, I is differentiable at
each ψ ∈ Uˆ , and for every φ ∈ intU , we have
∂I(φ) = co{lim
n
∇I(φn) : φn → φ, φn ∈ Uˆ}. (10)
The next result is an “envelope theorem” for Clarke differentials:
Lemma A.2 (Theorem 2.8.6 in Clarke (1990)). Suppose functional I : U → R is given by
I(·) = sup
t∈T
It(·)
for some indexed family of functionals (It)t∈T with domain U . Assume that there exists some
K > 0 such that |It(ψ)− It(ξ)| ≤ K‖ψ− ξ‖ for every t ∈ T and ψ, ξ ∈ intU . Then for every
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φ ∈ intU , we have ∂I(φ) ⊆ co{limi→∞∇Iti(φi) : φi → φ, ti ∈ T, Iti(φ)→ I(φ)}.
Last, we note the following relationship between properties of I and its Clarke differential:
Lemma A.3 (Part 1 of Proposition A.3 in GMM). If I : U → R is locally Lipschitz,
positively homogeneous, and 0 ∈ intU , then ∂I(φ) ⊆ ∂I(0) for all φ ∈ intU .
Lemma A.4 (Parts 2–3 of Proposition A.3 in GMM). If I : U → R is locally Lipschitz,
monotonic, and constant-additive, then ∂I(φ) ⊆ ∆(S) for all φ ∈ intU .
A.3 Boolean representation of locally Lipschitz I
Throughout this subsection, we assume that I : U → R is locally Lipschitz. Let Uˆ be the
generic subset given by Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.6 below shows that, restricted to Uˆ , I admits a Boolean representation in terms
of a family of affine functionals whose slopes correspond to gradients of I. This result extends
Ovchinnikov (2001), who establishes Lemma A.6 under the assumption that I is continuously
differentiable. Our non-smooth generalization is necessary for the proof of Theorem 1, where
the utility-act functional I is non-differentiable (except in the case of subjective expected
utility). We begin with a preliminary result:
Lemma A.5. For every φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ and ǫ > 0, there exists ξ ∈ Uˆ such that
I(ξ)− I(ψ) +∇I(ξ) · (ψ − ξ) ≥ 0, I(ξ)− I(φ) +∇I(ξ) · (φ− ξ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Take any φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ and ǫ > 0. Let m := I(ψ)− I(φ). If ∇I(φ) · (ψ − φ) ≥ m, we can
set ξ = φ. Likewise if ∇I(ψ) · (ψ − φ) ≥ m, we can set ξ = ψ. It remains to consider the
case
∇I(φ) · (ψ − φ),∇I(ψ) · (ψ − φ) < m. (11)
Define
H(λ) := I(φ+ λ(ψ − φ))− λm− I(φ)
for each λ ∈ R with φ+λ(ψ−φ) ∈ U . Since φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ , H is differentiable at λ ∈ {0, 1}, with
H(0) = H(1) = 0 and H ′(0), H ′(1) < 0 by assumption (11). Hence, H is negative for small
enough λ > 0 and positive for λ < 1 close enough to 1. Thus, the set {λ ∈ (0, 1) : H(λ) = 0}
is nonempty and closed; let λ∗ denote its supremum.
Since H is locally Lipschitz, we have H(λ) =
´ λ
λ∗
H ′(λ′)dλ′ for all λ > λ∗. As H(λ) > 0
for all λ ∈ (λ∗, 1), we can choose λ∗∗ ∈ (λ∗, 1) close enough to λ∗ such that H is differentiable
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at λ∗∗ with H ′(λ∗∗) > 0 and H(λ∗∗) ∈ (0, ǫ). But then
H ′(λ∗∗) = lim
t→0
I(φ+ (λ∗∗ + t)(ψ − φ))− I(φ+ λ∗∗(ψ − φ))
t
−m > 0,
which implies that
I◦(φ+ λ∗∗(ψ − φ);ψ − φ)−m ≥ H ′(λ∗∗) > 0.
Since I◦(ξ; ζ) = maxµ∈∂I(ξ) µ · ζ for any ζ, ξ (e.g., Proposition 2.1.2 in Clarke, 1990), this
yields some µ ∈ ∂I(φ+ λ∗∗(ψ − φ)) such that
µ · (ψ − φ)−m ≥ H ′(λ∗∗) > 0.
By (10), there exists a sequence ξn → φ + λ
∗∗(ψ − φ) such that ξn ∈ Uˆ for each n and
limn∇I(ξn) = µ. Then
lim
n
(I(ξn)− I(ψ) +∇I(ξn) · (ψ − ξn)) = I(φ+ λ
∗∗(ψ − φ))− I(ψ) + (1− λ∗∗)µ · (ψ − φ)
= H(λ∗∗)− (1− λ∗∗)m+ (1− λ∗∗)µ · (ψ − φ) > 0
where the inequality uses the fact that H(λ∗∗) > 0 and that µ · (ψ − φ)−m ≥ H ′(λ∗∗) > 0.
Similarly,
lim
n
(I(ξn)− I(φ) +∇I(ξn) · (φ− ξn)) = I(φ+ λ
∗∗(ψ − φ))− I(φ)− λ∗∗µ · (ψ − φ)
= H(λ∗∗) + λ∗∗m− λ∗∗µ · (ψ − φ) < ǫ
where the inequality uses H(λ∗∗) < ǫ and µ · (ψ−φ)−m ≥ H ′(λ∗∗) > 0. Thus, for any large
enough n, ξn ∈ Uˆ is as desired.
We now establish the Boolean representation of I:
Lemma A.6. For each φ ∈ Uˆ , we have
I(φ) = max
ψ∈Uˆ
inf
ξ∈Kψ
I(ξ) +∇I(ξ) · (φ− ξ),
where Kψ := {ξ ∈ Uˆ : I(ξ) +∇I(ξ) · (ψ − ξ) ≥ I(ψ)} for all ψ ∈ Uˆ .
Proof. For each φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ and ǫ > 0, Lemma A.5 yields some ξ ∈ Kψ such that I(ξ)+∇I(ξ) ·
(φ−ξ) ≤ I(φ)+ǫ. Thus, infξ∈Kψ I(ξ)+∇I(ξ) ·(φ−ξ) ≤ I(φ). Moreover, by definition of Kφ,
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infξ∈Kφ I(ξ) +∇I(ξ) · (φ− ξ) ≥ I(φ). Hence, I(φ) = maxψ∈Uˆ infξ∈Kψ I(ξ) +∇I(ξ) · (φ− ξ),
as required.
B Proofs for Section 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We invoke the following standard result:
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 1 in GMM). Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if there
exists a monotonic, constant-linear functional I : RS → R and a nonconstant affine function
u : ∆(Z)→ R such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f % g ⇐⇒ I(u(f)) ≥ I(u(g)). (12)
Moreover, I is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
The necessity proof for Theorem 1 is standard and we omit it. To prove sufficiency,
suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. Let I and u be as given by Lemma B.1. Consider the
collection P∗ given by (2), i.e.,
P∗ := cl{P ∗φ : φ ∈ R
S} with P ∗φ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : µ · φ ≥ I(φ)},
where cl denotes the topological closure in K(∆(S)) under the Hausdorff topology.
Note that since I is monotonic and constant-linear, it is 1-Lipschitz. Thus, ∂I(0) ⊆ ∆(S)
by Lemma A.4, so that each P ∗φ is indeed a closed, convex set of beliefs. Moreover, P
∗ is
compact, as it is a closed subset of the compact space K(∆(S)). Thus, P∗ is a belief-set
collection. We will show that for all φ ∈ RS,
I(φ) = max
P∈P∗
min
µ∈P
µ · φ, (13)
which by (12) ensures that (P∗, u) is a BEU representation of %.
Lemma A.1 yields a set Uˆ ⊆ RS such that RS \ Uˆ has Lebesgue measure zero and I is
differentiable on Uˆ . Moreover, since I is positively homogeneous, Lemma A.3 implies that
∂I(φ) ⊆ ∂I(0) for all φ ∈ RS, so that for all φ ∈ Uˆ , we have µφ := ∇I(φ) ∈ ∂I(0). We will
invoke the following lemma:
Lemma B.2. For each φ ∈ Uˆ , I(φ) = µφ · φ.
22
Proof. Take any φ ∈ Uˆ . By positive homogeneity of I, αφ ∈ Uˆ and ∇I(φ) = ∇I(αφ) for any
α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the function h : [0, 1]→ R defined by h(α) = I(αφ) is differentiable at every
α ∈ (0, 1) and Lipschitz. Hence, I(φ) = h(1) − h(0) =
´ 1
0
h′(α′)dα′ =
´ 1
0
(∇I(αφ) · φ)dα′ =
φ · µφ.
To complete the proof of (13), first take any φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ and let Kψ := {ξ ∈ Uˆ : I(ξ) + µξ ·
(ψ − ξ) ≥ I(ψ)} be as in Lemma A.6. Then
I(φ) = max
ψ∈Uˆ
inf
ξ∈Kψ
I(ξ) + µξ · (φ− ξ) = max
ψ∈Uˆ
inf
ξ∈Kψ
µξ · φ, (14)
where the first equality holds by Lemma A.6 and the second by Lemma B.2. Letting Pψ :=
{µξ : ξ ∈ Uˆ , µξ ·ψ ≥ I(ψ)}, Lemma B.2 ensures that ξ ∈ Kψ if and only if µξ ∈ Pψ. Moreover,
(10) implies that coPψ = P
∗
ψ. Combining these two observations with (14) yields
I(φ) = max
ψ∈Uˆ
inf
µ∈Pψ
µ · φ = max
ψ∈Uˆ
min
µ∈coPψ
µ · φ = max
ψ∈Uˆ
min
µ∈P ∗
ψ
µ · φ. (15)
Next, take any φ, ψ ∈ RS. Then there exist sequences φn → φ, ψn → ψ such that
φn, ψn ∈ Uˆ . For each n, pick µn ∈ P
∗
ψn
such that minµ∈P ∗
ψn
µ · φn = µn · φn and consider a
convergent subsequence (µnk) with limk→∞ µnk = µ
∗. Note that µ∗ ∈ P ∗ψ: Indeed, for each
k, we have µnk · ψnk ≥ I(ψnk), which by continuity of I implies µ
∗ · ψ ≥ I(ψ).
Moreover, for each k, we have µnk ·φnk = minµ∈P ∗ψn µ ·φnk ≤ I(φnk), where the inequality
holds by (15). Hence, continuity of I implies µ∗ · φ ≤ I(φ), so that
min
µ∈P ∗
ψ
µ · φ ≤ µ∗ · φ ≤ I(φ). (16)
Since (16) holds for all ψ ∈ RS, it follows from the definition of P∗ that
min
µ∈P
µ · φ ≤ I(φ)
holds for all P ∈ P∗. Finally, applying (16) with ψ = φ yields minµ∈P ∗
φ
µ · φ ≤ I(φ) ≤
minµ∈P ∗
φ
µ · φ, where the second inequality holds by definition of P ∗φ . Thus,
I(φ) = min
µ∈P ∗
φ
φ · µ = max
P∈P∗
min
µ∈P
µ · φ,
as required.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma B.3. Consider any functional I : RS → R and belief-set collection P such that
I(φ) = maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ · φ for all φ ∈ R
S. Then
∂I(0) ⊆ co
⋃
P∈P
P.
Proof. For each P ∈ P, let IP (φ) := minµ∈P µ · φ for each φ. Thus, I(φ) = maxP∈P IP (φ) for
each φ. Note that each IP is 1-Lipschitz and ∂IP (0) = P .
Take any convergent sequence (∇IPi(φi)) where φi → 0, Pi ∈ P, and ∇IPi(φi) exists for
each i. Then
∇IPi(φi) ∈ ∂IPi(φi) ⊆ ∂IPi(0) = Pi
where the set inclusion holds by Lemma A.3. Thus, limi∇IPi(φi) ∈ co
⋃
P∈P P . Hence, the
desired conclusion follows by applying Lemma A.2 to I.
Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5. Let I and u be as given by Lemma B.1. For P∗ as
in the sufficiency proof of Theorem 1, we have co
⋃
P∈P∗ P ⊆ ∂I(0). Thus, Lemma B.3
immediately implies that C = ∂I(0) is the unique closed, convex set satisfying (5) for all
BEU representations of %, with equality for representation P∗.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Since the proof of Proposition 1 identifies the set of relevant priors as C = ∂I(0), Corollary 1
is immediate from the following result in GMM:
Lemma B.4 (Theorem 14 in GMM). Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–5 and let I and u be as
in Lemma B.1. Then the unique closed, convex set D satisfying
f %∗ g ⇐⇒ Eµ[u(f)] ≥ Eµ[u(g)] for all µ ∈ D
is given by D = ∂I(0).
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C Proofs for Section 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2
For each preference %i, let utility ui and functional Ii be as given by Lemma B.1, and note
that %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2 if and only if u1 ≈ u2 and I1(φ) ≤ I2(φ) for all
φ ∈ RS.
Consider the belief-set collection Pˆi defined by
Pˆi = cl{Pˆ
i
φ : φ ∈ R
S} with Pˆ iφ = {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ · φ ≥ Ii(φ)}. (17)
Observe first that (Pˆi, ui) is a BEU representation of %i. Indeed, for each φ, we have
maxP∈Pˆi minµ∈P φ · µ ≥ minµ∈Pˆ iφ
φ · µ ≥ Ii(φ) by construction. Conversely, letting P
∗
i be the
belief-set collection defined by (2), we have maxP∈Pˆi minµ∈P φ · µ ≤ maxP∈P∗i minµ∈P φ · µ =
Ii(φ), where the inequality follows from the fact that Pˆ
i
ψ ⊇ P
∗i
ψ for each ψ.
Note next that Pˆi ⊒-dominates all BEU representations of %i. Indeed, consider any
BEU representation P of %i and any Pˆ ∈ Pˆi. By definition of Pˆi, there exists a sequence
(φn) with Pˆ
i
φn
→ Pˆ . Since P represents %i, there exists Pn ∈ P for each n such that
minµ∈Pn µ · φn = Ii(φn). By definition of Pˆ
i
φn
, this implies Pn ⊆ Pˆ
i
φn
, whence
min
µ∈Pn
µ · φ ≥ min
µ∈Pˆ i
φn
µ · φ (18)
for all φ ∈ RS. By compactness of P, restricting to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume
that limn Pn = P for some P ∈ P. Then by (18), we have minµ∈P µ · φ ≥ minµ∈Pˆ µ · φ for all
φ. Thus, P ⊆ Pˆ by the standard property of support functions.
We now prove the equivalence between parts 1 and 2 of the proposition. Suppose first
that %1 is more ambiguity-averse than %2, so that u1 ≈ u2 and I1 ≤ I2. Then for all
φ, the fact that I1(φ) ≤ I2(φ) implies Pˆ
1
φ ⊇ Pˆ
2
φ . By the same argument as in the previous
paragraph, it follows that for any Pˆ1 ∈ Pˆ1, there exists Pˆ2 ∈ Pˆ2 with Pˆ2 ⊆ Pˆ1. Thus, Pˆ1 ⊒ Pˆ2.
Consider now any BEU representation (P2, u2) of %2. We have Pˆ1 ⊒ Pˆ2 ⊒ P2, where the
latter inequality comes from the ⊒-maximality of Pˆ2. Hence, Pˆ1 ⊒ P2 by transitivity of ⊒,
proving part 2.
Conversely, consider the BEU representation (P1, u) of %1 described in part 2 and any
representation (P2, u) of %2. Fix φ ∈ R
S, and let P1 be any element of P1 such that
I1(φ) = minµ∈P1 µ · φ. Since P1 ⊒ P2, there exists P2 ∈ P2 with P1 ⊇ P2, implying I2(φ) ≥
minµ∈P2 µ · φ ≥ minµ∈P1 µ · φ = I1(φ). Thus, I2(φ) ≥ I1(φ) for all φ ∈ R
S, implying that %1
is more ambiguity-averse than %2.
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We combine the proof of Lemma 1 with the proof of Theorem 2 (part 2) below.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, let I be the functional given by Lemma B.1.
C.3.1 Proof of part 1
To prove the “only if” direction, suppose that % satisfies uncertainty aversion. Since it
admits the maxmin expected utility representation of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), I(φ) =
minµ∈C µ · φ holds for all φ.
We first show that ∩P∈PP ⊇ C. If not, there exists P ∈ P such that P 6⊇ C. By the
standard property of support functions, this implies the existence of φ such thatminµ∈C φ·µ <
minµ∈P φ · µ. This leads to I(φ) > minµ∈C µ · φ, a contradiction.
We now show that ∩P∈PP ⊆ C. If not, there exists µ
∗ ∈ ∩P∈PP \C. Then there exists φ
such that minµ∈C µ ·φ > µ
∗ ·φ. But this implies I(φ) ≤ µ∗ ·φ < minµ∈C µ ·φ, a contradiction.
To prove the “ if” direction, suppose that ∩P∈PP = C. Take any φ. It suffices to show
that I(φ) = minµ∈C µ · φ. Note that by construction of the representation P
∗ defined by
(2), we have I(φ) ≥ minµ∈C µ · φ. But the representation based on P yields the inequality
I(φ) ≤ minµ∈∩P∈PP µ · φ = minµ∈C µ · φ, which ensures the desired claim.
C.3.2 Proof of part 2 and Lemma 1
We prove the equivalence
absolute ambiguity aversion⇔∞-ambiguity aversion⇔ |S|-ambiguity aversion
⇔
⋂
P∈P
P 6= ∅,
which implies both part 2 of Theorem 2 and Lemma 1.
The implication absolute ambiguity aversion ⇒ ∞-ambiguity aversion follows from the
proofs of Theorem 2a and Corollary 3a in Grant and Polak (2013), which imply the equiv-
alence of absolute ambiguity aversion and ∞-ambiguity aversion for any preference with a
normalized, monotonic, continuous, constant-additive, and unbounded utility act functional
I (as is the case for BEU). The implication∞- ambiguity aversion ⇒ |S|- ambiguity aversion
is trivial.
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We now turn to the implication |S|-ambiguity aversion ⇒ ∩P∈PP 6= ∅. If % satisfies
|S|-ambiguity aversion, then by part 3 of the theorem (see the proof below) any BEU rep-
resentation (P, u) of % is such that every subcollection of P of cardinality at most |S| has
nonempty intersection. Since each Pi is convex and compact, Helly’s theorem implies that
the whole collection P has nonempty intersection.27 This proves the implication.
Finally, we prove the implication
⋂
P∈P P 6= ∅ ⇒ absolute ambiguity aversion. Suppose
that there exists µ∗ ∈
⋂
P∈P P for some BEU representation (P, u) of %. For any f ∈ F and
any P ∈ P, this implies thatminµ∈P µ · u(f) ≤ µ
∗ ·u(f), and hence maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ · u(f) ≤
µ∗ · u(f). As a result,
f % p =⇒ max
P∈P
min
µ∈P
µ · u(f) ≥ u(p) =⇒ µ∗ · u(f) ≥ u(p) =⇒ f %µ∗ p
where %µ∗ is the subjective expected utility preference with belief µ
∗ and utility function u.
Hence, % is more ambiguity-averse than %µ∗ , which proves the result.
C.3.3 Proof of part 3
The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. Suppose that preference % admits a BEU representation (P, u). Then %
satisfies k-ambiguity aversion if and only if
k−1∑
i=1
max
Pi∈P
min
µi∈Pi
µi · φi ≤ min
P∈P
max
µ∈P
µ ·
k−1∑
i=1
φi, for all φ1, · · · , φk−1 ∈ R
S. (19)
Proof. To prove the “if” part, suppose inequality (19) is satisfied. Consider any f1, · · · , fk ∈
F such that f1 ∼ fi for all i and
1
k
f1 + · · ·+
1
k
fk = p for some p ∈ ∆(Z). We have
I(
1
k
u(fk)) = I(u(p)−
k−1∑
i=1
1
k
u(fi)) = u(p)−min
P∈P
max
µ∈P
k−1∑
i=1
1
k
u(fi) · µ
≤ u(p)−
k−1∑
i=1
max
Pi∈P
min
µi∈Pi
1
k
u(fi) · µi = u(p)−
k−1∑
i=1
I(
1
k
u(fi)),
where the inequality holds by (19). Rearranging yields
∑k
i=1 I(
1
k
u(fi)) ≤ u(p), which is
simply I(u(f1)) ≤ u(p) since I(u(fi)) = I(u(f1)) for all i. This is turn implies p % f1, and
thus % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion.
27Recall that ∆(S) has dimension |S| − 1.
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To prove the “only if” part, suppose that there exist some vectors φ1, · · · , φk−1 such
that the inequality (19) is violated. By the constant linearity of the max-min and min-max
functionals, we can assume without loss of generality that I(φi) = I(φ1) for all i, and that
each φi belongs to [−1, 1]
S.
Let c ∈ R be given by c = −I(−φ1− . . .−φk−1)+ I(φ1), so that I(c−φ1− · · ·−φk−1) =
I(φ1). Note that c ∈ [−k, k]. Let φk ∈ R
S be defined by φk = c − φ1 − · · · − φk−1, which
implies φ1 + · · ·+ φk = c. Up to rescaling all the φis and c by a common factor, this vector
φk also belongs to [−1, 1]
S. By definition of c, we have I(φk) = I(φ1), and
I(φk) = I(c−
k−1∑
i=1
φi) = c−min
P∈P
max
µ∈P
µ ·
k−1∑
i=1
φi > c−
k−1∑
i=1
max
Pi∈P
min
µi∈Pi
µi · φi
= c−
k−1∑
i=1
I(φi).
Rearranging yields
∑k
i=1 I(φi) > c, which implies I(φ1) >
c
k
.
To conclude the proof, we assume that u(z) ≥ 1, u(z) ≤ −1 for some outcomes z, z ∈ Z.
(This is without loss of generality by taking a positive affine transformation of u if necessary.)
Since each φi belongs to [−1, 1]
S, it is possible to find weights (ǫsi ) such that the act fi that
maps each state s into the lottery ǫsiδz + (1 − ǫ
s
i )δz¯ satisfies u(fi) = φi. In addition, the
fact that
∑k
i=1 u(fi) is a constant vector equal to c shows that
∑k
i=1
1
k
fi is a constant act
that delivers a lottery p supported on {z¯, z}, where u(p) = c
k
. The collection (f1, · · · , fk)
thus satisfies 1
k
f1 + · · · +
1
k
fk = p, fi ∼ f1 for all i since I(φi) = I(φ1), and f1 ≻ p since
I(φ1) >
c
k
= u(p). Hence, % does not satisfy k-ambiguity aversion.
Let us now prove part 3 of the theorem.
Sufficiency. Suppose that P1 ∩ · · · ∩ Pk 6= ∅ for all P1, · · · , Pk ∈ P. Consider any
P1, · · · , Pk and some vectors (φ1, · · · , φk−1). Let µ ∈ P1 ∩ · · · ∩ Pk. We have
min
µ1∈P1,··· ,µk−1∈Pk−1
k−1∑
i=1
µi · φi ≤
k−1∑
i=1
µ · φi ≤ max
µk∈Pk
k−1∑
i=1
µk · φi
where the first inequality is due to the fact that µ ∈ Pi for all i ≤ k − 1, and the second
inequality is due to the fact that µ ∈ Pk. Since this is true for any P1, · · · , Pk, this implies
max
(P1,··· ,Pk−1)∈Pk−1
min
µ1∈P1,··· ,µk−1∈Pk−1
k−1∑
i=1
µi · φi ≤ min
Pk∈P
max
µk∈Pk
k−1∑
i=1
µk · φi,
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i.e.,
k−1∑
i=1
max
Pi∈P
min
µi∈Pi
µi · φi ≤ min
Pk∈P
max
µk∈P
µk ·
k−1∑
i=1
φi.
Thus, by Lemma C.1 % satisfies k-ambiguity aversion.
Necessity. Suppose that there exist P1, · · · , Pk ∈ P such that P1∩· · ·∩Pk = ∅. Consider
the sets A,B ⊆ RS(k−1) defined by
A = {(µ1, · · · , µk−1) : µi ∈ Pi} and B = {(µk, · · · , µk) : µk ∈ Pk}.
The setsA andB are compact and convex. In addition, A∩B = ∅ since any (µk, · · · , µk) ∈
A∩B would satisfy µk ∈ P1∩· · ·∩Pk, which is a contradiction. By the separating hyperplane
theorem there exists a vector φ = (φ1, · · · , φk−1) ∈ R
S(k−1), where each φi ∈ R
S, such that
mina∈A a · φ > maxb∈B b · φ, which is equivalent to
min
µ1∈P1,··· ,µk−1∈Pk−1
k−1∑
i=1
µi · φi > max
µ∈Pk
k−1∑
i=1
µ · φi.
Hence,
k−1∑
i=1
max
Pi∈P
min
µi∈Pi
µi · φi ≥ min
µ1∈P1,··· ,µk−1∈Pk−1
k−1∑
i=1
µi · φi > max
µ∈Pk
k−1∑
i=1
µ · φi ≥ min
P∈P
max
µ∈P
µ ·
k−1∑
i=1
φi.
Thus, by Lemma C.1 % does not satisfy k-ambiguity aversion.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Note that m(E) = maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(E) while m(E
c) = 1−minP∈Pmaxµ∈P µ(E), and thus
AA(E) = minP∈Pmaxµ∈P µ(E)−maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(E). This implies that AA(E) ≥ 0 if and
only if all P, P ′ ∈ P satisfy maxµ∈P µ(E) ≥ minµ′∈P ′ µ
′(E), i.e., if and only if {µ(E) : µ ∈
P} ∩ {µ′(E) : µ′ ∈ P ′} 6= ∅.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For any % with BEU representation (P, u), note that m(E) = maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(E) for
all events E. Thus, given E and F as in the proposition, it suffices to find ν ∈ ∆(S)
and a belief-set collection P such that maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(E) < ν(E) for all E ∈ E and
maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(F ) > ν(F ) for all F ∈ F .
Pick any β > 0 and ν ∈ ∆(S) with β < mins∈S ν(s). Define P by P = {PF : F ∈ F},
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where for each F ∈ F ,
PF := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(F ) = ν(F ) +
β
2
, µ(E) ∈ [ν(E)− β, ν(E) + β] ∀E ⊆ S}.
Note that each PF is nonempty: Indeed, pick any s ∈ F and s
′ ∈ F c (which exist since
F /∈ {S, ∅}). Then setting µ(s) = ν(s) + β
2
, µ(s′) = ν(s′) − β
2
, and µ(s′′) = ν(s′′) for all
s′′ 6= s, s′′ yields µ ∈ PF . Since PF is also closed and convex, P is a well-defined belief-set
collection.
By definition of P, maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(F ) ≥ ν(F ) +
β
2
> ν(F ) for all F ∈ F . To complete
the proof, we show that maxP∈Pminµ∈P µ(E) ≤ ν(E)−
β
2
< ν(E) for all E ∈ E . Consider any
E ∈ E , F ∈ F . Since E 6= F (as E and F are disjoint), we either have (a) F \E 6= ∅ 6= E \F ;
(b) E ( F ; or (c) F ( E. In each case, we show that minµ∈PF µ(E) ≤ ν(E) −
β
2
by
constructing a µ ∈ PF such that µ(E) = ν(E)−
β
2
:
In case (a), pick s ∈ F \ E and s′ ∈ E \ F . Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s) + β
2
,
µ(s′) = ν(s)− β
2
, and µ(s′′) = ν(s′′) for all s′′ 6= s, s′.
In case (b), pick s ∈ F \E, s′ ∈ E, and s′′ ∈ F c ⊆ Ec. Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s)+β,
µ(s′) = ν(s′)− β
2
, µ(s′′) = ν(s′′)− β
2
, and µ(s′′′) = ν(s′′′) for all s′′′ 6= s, s′, s′′.
In case (c), pick s ∈ F , s′ ∈ E \F , and s′′ ∈ Ec ⊆ F c. Then define µ by µ(s) = ν(s)+ β
2
,
µ(s′) = ν(s′)− β, µ(s′′) = ν(s′′) + β
2
, and µ(s′′′) = ν(s′′′) for all s′′′ 6= s, s′, s′′.
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Supplementary Appendix to “Boolean Representations of
Preferences under Ambiguity”
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, and Yves Le Yaouanq
This supplementary appendix is organized as follows. Section S.1 formalizes the unique-
ness properties of BEU representations. Section S.2 focuses on the representation obtained
by inverting the order of moves of Optimism and Pessimism and uses this to characterize
different degrees of ambiguity seeking. Sections S.3 and S.4 present two generalizations of
BEU that correspond to relaxations of certainty independence.
S.1 Uniqueness
For any φ ∈ RS and λ ∈ R, let Hφ,λ := {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ · φ ≥ λ} denote the closed half-space
in ∆(S) that is defined by φ and λ. For any belief-set collection P, define its half-space
closure by
P := {H ⊆ ∆(S) : H is a closed half-space in ∆(S) and P ⊆ H for some P ∈ P}.
Proposition S.1.1. Suppose (P, u) is a BEU representation of %. Then for any belief-set
collection P′ and utility u′, (P′, u′) is a BEU representation of % if and only if P = P′ and
u ≈ u′.
Below we fix the unique functional I : RS → R associated with %, as given by Lemma B.1.
We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma S.1.1. Suppose (P, u) is a BEU representation of %. Then P = {Hφ,λ : φ ∈ R
S, λ ≤
I(φ)}.
Proof. First, take any φ ∈ RS, λ ∈ R such that λ ≤ I(φ). Since (P, u) represents %, there
exists P ∈ P such that minµ∈P µ · φ = I(φ). Thus, P ⊆ Hφ,I(φ) ⊆ Hφ,λ, which implies
Hφ,λ ∈ P.
Conversely, take any P ∈ P. By definition of P, there exist φ ∈ RS, λ ∈ R, and P ′ ∈ P
such that P ′ ⊆ P = Hφ,λ. Since (P, u) represents %, I(φ) ≥ minµ∈P ′ µ · φ ≥ minµ∈Hφ,λ φ · µ.
Hence, λ ≤ I(φ).
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Proof of Proposition S.1.1. For the “only if” direction, the fact that P = P′ is immediate
from Lemma S.1.1 and uniqueness of I. The proof that u ≈ u′ is standard.
For the “if” direction, by uniqueness of I, it suffices to show that maxP ′∈P′ minµ∈P ′ µ ·φ =
I(φ) for all φ ∈ RS. To show this, observe first that by Lemma S.1.1 and since P = P
′
,
there exists P ′ ∈ P′ such that P ′ ⊆ Hφ,I(φ). This ensures minµ∈P ′ µ · φ ≥ I(φ). Suppose next
that minµ∈P ′′ µ · φ − I(φ) =: ǫ > 0 for some P
′′ ∈ P′. Then Hφ,I(φ)+ǫ ⊇ P
′′, which implies
Hφ,I(φ)+ǫ ∈ P′. Since P′ = P, this contradicts Lemma S.1.1.
S.2 Minmax BEU representation
While BEU assumes that Optimism plays first and Pessimism plays second, this is equivalent
to a model with the opposite order of moves. We omit all proofs for this section, as they can
be obtained as minor modifications of the original proofs for BEU.
Theorem S.2.1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–5 if and only if % admits a minmax BEU
representation, i.e., there exists a belief-set collection Q and a nonconstant affine utility
u : ∆(Z)→ R such that
W (f) = min
Q∈Q
max
µ∈Q
Eµ[u(f)]
represents %.
Our construction of the maxmin BEU representation considered in the text uses the belief-
set collection P∗ = cl{P ∗φ : φ ∈ R
S} with P ∗φ := {µ ∈ ∂I(0) : µ · φ ≥ I(φ)}. Analogously,
it can be shown that the belief-set collection Q∗ := cl{Q∗φ : φ ∈ R
S} with Q∗φ := {µ ∈
∂I(0) : µ · φ ≤ I(φ)} yields a minmax BEU representation. Paralleling Section 2.3, it is
straightforward to show that C := ∂I(0) again corresponds to the smallest set of priors that
is contained in co
⋃
Q∈QQ for all minmax BEU representations Q of %, with equality for
representation Q∗.
While the different notions of ambiguity aversion are most conveniently characterized
using the maxmin BEU representation (cf. Theorem 2), the minmax BEU representation is
useful for characterizing their ambiguity-seeking counterparts. Axioms 8 and 9 and Theo-
rem S.2.2 below provide the analogs of Axioms 6 and 7 and Theorem 2, respectively.
Axiom 8 (Uncertainty Seeking). If f, g ∈ F with f ∼ g, then
1
2
f +
1
2
g - f .
Axiom 9 (k-Ambiguity Seeking). For all f1, ..., fk ∈ F with f1 ∼ f2 ∼ · · · ∼ fk and any
p ∈ ∆(Z),
1
k
f1 + · · ·+
1
k
fk = p⇒ p - f1.
2
We say that % is absolutely ambiguity-seeking if there exists a nondegenerate subjective
expected utility preference that is more ambiguity-averse than %. Analogous to Lemma 1,
this is characterized by ∞-ambiguity seeking, i.e., k-ambiguity seeking for all k.
Theorem S.2.2. Suppose that % admits a minmax BEU representation (Q, u). Then:
1. % satisfies uncertainty seeking if and only if
⋂
Q∈Q
Q = C;
2. % is absolutely ambiguity-seeking if and only if
⋂
Q∈Q
Q 6= ∅;
3. % satisfies k-ambiguity seeking if and only if
⋂
i=1,··· ,kQi 6= ∅ for all Q1, · · · , Qk ∈ Q.
S.3 Boolean variational representation
The variational model introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) (hence-
forth, MMR) relies on the following relaxation of certainty independence, which retains the
“location invariance” property of preferences but relaxes the “scale invariance” property; we
refer to MMR for a discussion.
Axiom 10 (Weak Certainty Independence). For any f, g ∈ F , p, q ∈ ∆(Z), and α ∈ (0, 1),
αf + (1− α)p % αg + (1− α)p =⇒ αf + (1− α)q % αg + (1− α)q.
We now show that dropping uncertainty aversion from MMR’s axioms corresponds to
adding a maximization stage into the variational model. A cost collection is a collection
of functions c : ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} such that each c ∈ C is convex and C is grounded (i.e.,
maxc∈Cminµ∈∆(S) c(µ) = 0).
Theorem S.3.1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 10 if and only if % admits
a Boolean variational (BV) representation, i.e., there exists a cost collection C and a
nonconstant affine utility u : ∆(Z)→ R such that
WBV (f) := max
c∈C
min
µ∈∆(S)
Eµ[u(f)] + c(µ) (20)
is well-defined and represents %.
We note that our characterization of the set of relevant priors under BEU generalizes
to the Boolean variational model. Specifically, let dom(c) := {µ : c(µ) ∈ R} denote the
effective domain of any cost function. Then there exists a unique closed, convex set C such
3
that C ⊆ co
(⋃
c∈C dom(c)
)
for all Boolean variational representations of %, with equality for
the representation C∗ we construct in the proof of Theorem S.3.1 below. Moreover, it can
again be shown that C is the Bewley set of the unambigous preference %∗. The argument
relies on the observation that C = co
(⋃
φ∈intU ∂I(φ)
)
, where I is the utility act functional
obtained in the proof of Theorem S.3.1 and U its domain. Details are available on request.
S.3.1 Proof of Theorem S.3.1
We will invoke the following result from MMR:
Lemma S.3.1 (Lemma 28 in MMR). Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 10 if
and only if there exists a nonconstant affine function u : ∆(Z) → R with U := (u(∆(Z)))S
and a normalized niveloid I : U → R such that I ◦ u represents %.
Recall that functional I : U → R is a niveloid if I(φ) − I(ψ) ≤ maxs(φs − ψs) for all
φ, ψ ∈ U . Lemma 25 in MMR shows that I is a niveloid if and only if it is monotonic and
constant-additive.
Based on this result, the necessity direction of Theorem S.3.1 is standard. We now prove
the sufficiency direction. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 10. Let I, u, and U be
as given by Lemma S.3.1. Since I is a niveloid, it is 1-Lipschitz. Hence, Lemma A.1 yields a
subset Uˆ ⊆ intU with U \ Uˆ of Lebesgue measure 0 such that I is differentiable on Uˆ . Define
µψ := ∇I(ψ) and wψ := I(ψ)−∇I(ψ) · ψ for each ψ ∈ Uˆ . By Lemma A.4 and the fact that
niveloids are monotonic and constant-additive, µψ ∈ ∆(S) for all ψ ∈ Uˆ . For each ψ ∈ U ,
define
Dψ := {(µ,w) ∈ ∆(S)× R : µ · ψ + w ≥ I(ψ)} ∩ co{(µξ, wξ) : ξ ∈ Uˆ},
and let D := {Dψ : ψ ∈ U}. The following lemma implies that each Dψ is nonempty; note
also that it is closed, convex, and bounded below.
Lemma S.3.2. For every φ, ψ ∈ U , min(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ+ w ≤ I(φ) with equality if φ = ψ.
Proof. First, consider any φ, ψ ∈ Uˆ . Let Kψ := {ξ ∈ Uˆ : µξ · ψ + wξ ≥ I(ψ)} be as in
Lemma A.6. Note that Dψ = co{(µξ, wξ) : ξ ∈ Kψ}, so that
inf
ξ∈Kψ
µξ · φ+ wξ = min
(µ,w)∈Dψ
µ · φ+ w,
where the minimum is attained as Dψ is closed and bounded below. Thus, Lemma A.6
implies that
min
(µ,w)∈Dψ
µ · φ+ w ≤ I(φ), (21)
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where (21) holds with equality if ψ = φ by definition of Dψ.
Next, consider any φ, ψ ∈ U . Take sequences φn → φ, ψn → ψ such that φn, ψn ∈ Uˆ for
each n, where we choose φn = ψn if φ = ψ. For each n, the previous paragraph yields some
(µn, wn) ∈ Dψn such that µn · φn + wn = min(µ,w)∈Dψn µ · φn + w ≤ I(φn), with equality if
φ = ψ. Thus, for each n, we have I(ψn) − µn · ψn ≤ wn ≤ I(φn) − µn · φn. Since φn → φ,
ψn → ψ, and I is continuous, this implies that sequence (wn) is bounded. Thus, up to
restricting to a suitable subsequence, we can assume that (µn, wn) → (µ∞, w∞) for some
(µ∞, w∞) ∈ ∆(S) × R. Then (µ∞, w∞) ∈ Dψ and µ∞ · φ + w∞ ≤ I(φ) by continuity of I,
with equality if φ = ψ. Thus, min(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w = inf(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ + w ≤ I(φ), with
equality if φ = ψ, where the minimum is attained since Dψ is closed and bounded below.
Finally, we obtain a Boolean variational representation of % as follows. For each D ∈ D,
define cD : ∆(S) → R ∪ {∞} by cD(µ) := inf{w ∈ R : (µ,w) ∈ D} for each µ ∈ ∆(S),
where by convention the infimum of the empty set is ∞. Note that cD is convex for all D
by convexity of D. Moreover, for all φ ∈ U , min(µ,w)∈D µ · φ + w = minµ∈∆(S) µ · φ + cD(µ).
Thus, Lemma S.3.2 implies
I(φ) = max
D∈D
min
µ∈∆(S)
µ · φ+ cD(µ) (22)
for all φ ∈ U . Since I is normalized, applying (22) to any constant vector a ∈ U , yields
I(a) = a+maxD∈Dminµ∈∆(S) cD(µ) = a. Thus, collection (cD)D∈D is grounded. Hence, C
∗ :=
{cD : D ∈ D} is a cost collection and (C
∗, u) is a BV representation of % by Lemma S.3.1.
S.4 Rational Boolean representation
Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011) (henceforth, CMMM) main-
tain uncertainty aversion, but further relax independence to hold only for objective lotteries:
Axiom 11 (Risk Independence). For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ (0, 1),
p % q =⇒ αp+ (1− α)r % αq + (1− α)r.
Dropping uncertainty aversion from CMMM’s axioms yields the following Boolean gen-
eralization of their representation:
Theorem S.4.1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and Axiom 11 if and only if % admits a
rational Boolean (RB) representation, i.e., there exists a collection (Gt)t∈T of quasiconvex
functions Gt : R×∆(S)→ R∪{∞} that are increasing in their first argument and grounded
28
28That is, maxt∈T infµ∈∆(S)Gt(a, µ) = a for all a.
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and a nonconstant affine utility u : ∆(Z)→ R such that
WRB(f) := max
t∈T
inf
µ∈∆(S)
Gt(Eµ[u(f)], µ) (23)
is well-defined, continuous, and represents %.
S.4.1 Proof of Theorem S.4.1
The following result follows from a minor modification of the proof of Lemma 57 in CMMM:
Lemma S.4.1. Preference % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and 11 if and only if there exists a non-
constant affine function u : ∆(Z)→ R with U := (u(∆(Z)))S and a monotonic, normalized
and continuous functional I : U → R such that I ◦ u represents %.
Based on this result, the necessity direction of Theorem S.4.1 is standard. We now prove the
sufficiency direction. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1–4 and 11. Let I, u, and U be as given
by Lemma S.4.1.
Define Dψ := {(µ, I(ψ) − µ · ψ) ∈ R
S
+ × R : µ ∈ R
S
+} for each ψ ∈ U . Note that Dψ is
nonempty and convex. Let Iψ(φ) := inf(µ,w)∈Dψ µ · φ+ w for each φ, ψ ∈ U .
Take any φ, ψ ∈ U . Observe that
Iψ(φ) = inf
α>0,s∈S
I(ψ) + α(φs − ψs) =


I(ψ) if φ ≥ ψ
−∞ if φ 6≥ ψ
Thus, I(φ) ≥ Iψ(φ) by monotonicity of I, with equality if φ = ψ. That is, for each φ ∈ U ,
I(φ) = max
ψ∈U
Iψ(φ). (24)
For each ψ ∈ U , define a function Gψ : R×∆(S)→ R ∪ {∞} by
Gψ(t, µ) = sup{Iψ(ξ) : ξ ∈ U, ξ · µ ≤ t}
for each (t, µ). The map is quasi-convex (Lemma 31 in CMMM) and increasing in t.
Lemma S.4.2. Iψ(φ) = infµ∈∆(S)Gψ(µ · φ, µ) for each φ, ψ ∈ U .
Proof. Observe that RHS = infµ∈∆(S) sup{Iψ(ξ) : ξ · µ ≤ φ · µ}. To see that LHS ≤ RHS,
observe that Iψ(φ) ≤ sup{Iψ(ξ) : ξ · µ ≤ φ · µ} holds for any µ ∈ ∆(S).
To see that LHS ≥ RHS, note first that if φ ≥ ψ then LHS = I(ψ) and RHS ∈
{I(ψ),−∞}, so the inequality clearly holds. If φ 6≥ ψ then φs < ψs for some s ∈ S.
6
Thus, by taking µ = δs, any ξ with ξ ·µ ≤ φ ·µ satisfies ξs ≤ φs, which implies ξ 6≥ ψ, whence
Iψ(ξ) = −∞.
Setting T = U , Lemma S.4.2 and (24) ensure that WRB given by (23) represents %
and is continuous. Finally, to check groundedness, note that since I is normalized, we have
a = I(a) = maxψ∈U infµ∈∆(S)Gψ(a, µ) for any a ∈ R.
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